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As environmental pressures on our planet continue
to increase, there is a new urgency to find ways for-
ward in making practical decisions. The difficulty in
making such decisions is well known, given the diver-
sity of interests and conflicting assessment of priorities
in each case (Huxham & Sumner 2000: ix–xi). There
are a number of possible underlying causes of these
difficulties. In general, there has been a bias towards
constructing the framework of decision-making in
terms of specific cases, judged in terms of the relative
risk or benefit of a particular action(s).1 A case-by-case
pragmatic approach certainly yields results that are
specific for the issue in hand, but is not the only way of
describing ethical choice. I have suggested that in the
particular situation of GMOs such a framing assumes a
consequentialist approach to ethics that is not neces-
sarily sufficient, given that risks are in many cases not
readily quantified and the benefits more often than not
directed to a particular group or community (Deane-
Drummond 2001:119–28).2 If environmental risks are
unclear, such as is often the case with genetically mod-
ified (GM) crops, then decisions will either take place
on the basis of supposed benefits, highlighted as gen-
eral advantages by a particular interest group, or the
precautionary principle will be invoked in order to
delay action until such time as the risks are quantified.
The precautionary principle is sometimes defined as ‘a
strategy for dealing with environmental risk and
uncertainty, which guides us to act cautiously and
embark on a systematic programme of research to
improve our understanding of the costs and benefits of
particular actions’ (BMA 1999:17). There are a number
of difficulties associated with this type of precautionary
approach (Merritt & Jones 2000:84–87). In the first
place there are different assessments as to the degree
of environmental risk in defining when the precaution-
ary principle will take effect. Secondly, the extent of
environmental risk is itself highly contested (Lash et al.
1996). Of course there are some who interpret the pre-
cautionary principle as the basis for inaction unless
positive damage is proven not to be the case. Donald
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1 I am using the term ‘risk’ in a traditional, rationalist sense;
though as Donald Bruce suggests, there have been moves
away from this definition in more recent discussions. See
Bruce (2001).
2 I am not implying that consequences should never be taken
into account, rather than viewing the problem just in terms
of consequences alone may miss out other aspects of ethical
insight that need to be taken into account.ESEP 2002, 65–74
Bruce has discussed the competing visions of precau-
tion (Bruce 2001). The language of precaution, rather
like that of sustainability, can be filled out with differ-
ent contents depending on the players involved. Such
a discovery implies that we need to look behind the
language to the motivation of those who are using such
language. This is the province of virtue ethics. I hope to
show that one way of filling out what a virtue ethic
might look like from a Christian perspective draws on
a rediscovery of the importance of wisdom. Wisdom in
addition includes the idea of prudence, or practical
wisdom, which in its turn includes the concept of pre-
caution. Precaution thus becomes both situated and
critiqued in the context of a wider Christian vision of
reality. 
The philosopher Mary Midgley has also identified
another problem when it comes to making decisions
about the environment. She suggests that even if the
risks are well known, inaction will still follow if the
imagination is not sufficiently engaged. In other words,
bald scientific facts about the perilous state of the
planet are insufficient to motivate action or decision-
making in its favour (Midgley 2001:188). While she
sees that there are signs that people do care about the
earth, the reason for this is not so much the threat of
environmental collapse, as a renewed sense that we
are part of the earth and have evolved from it. Midgley
believes that Gaian thinking can serve to challenge
acute individualism and anthropocentrism, which she
identifies as the heart of the problem (Midgley 2001:
171–174). Gaian thinking is certainly suggestive of a
more holistic understanding of reality. However, as I
have argued elsewhere, there are theological and eth-
ical problems associated with a Gaian approach to the
world (Deane-Drummond 2001: 165–183). For exam-
ple, in its more idealistic forms, Gaia seems not only to
equalise the place of humanity in relation to other spe-
cies, but also to put bacteria and blue green algae at
the top of the pyramid. Furthermore, if Gaia is held to
be a stabilising global system, it could be used to sup-
port environmental abuse, rather than the opposite. 
I suggest that Midgley is, nonetheless, correct in
searching for alternative ways of approaching the way
we think about the earth and identifying underlying
values that are behind our decision-making. A com-
mon Christian response to these difficulties has been to
advocate the ideal of stewardship (Berry 2000: 25).
While this can take us some way in making responsible
decisions, the will to change remains largely
untouched through this motif alone. Furthermore,
stewardship often implies management of the planet,
which in itself can be suggestive of a somewhat
anthropocentric epistemology. While it is preferable to
other biblical motifs such as the idea of kingship, it still
tends to be hierarchical in its assumption that nature is
somehow ‘below’ the order of humankind, human are
‘stewards’ over against the natural world. From a his-
torical perspective the interpretation of the notion of
stewardship is problematic, associated with ideas
about dominion and dreams about repairing the nat-
ural world through human ingenuity (Bauckham 2000:
100–102). A third alternative is that of kinship, devel-
oping the notion that all creatures are in some sense
part of who we are as human beings. Such a view is not
only consistent with evolutionary science, it also artic-
ulates an important biblical principle, namely that the
creatures of the earth, including humans, give glory to
God, rather than human beings alone (Bauckham
2002). 
In this paper I suggest that one way to develop an
ethic towards the natural world that highlights the
notion of kinship is through a recovery of the idea of
wisdom. Such a recovery has a number of advantages.
Firstly, it challenges the idea that science is the only
way of knowing, instead wisdom invites a broader
frame of reference compared with the fragmented
problem solving approach characteristic of much of
modern science (Deane-Drummond 2000:5–14). In the
second place it connects with the philosophical trend
in ethics that focuses on agents and attitudes rather
than actions, known as virtue ethics. In the third place
wisdom draws on ancient theological traditions and
resonates with theological imagination. As such it can
offer a vision that serves to inspire appropriate action.
In the fourth place wisdom has ethical outcomes
through its association with the cardinal virtues of
practical wisdom or prudence, justice, temperance and
fortitude. In this paper I focus specifically on the 2
virtues of prudence and justice and how they might be
expressed in practice, as they seem to me to be of par-
ticular relevance to environmental decision-making. 
The special attention to consequentialism in environ-
mental decision-making may seem somewhat surpris-
ing given the strong move in contemporary philosophy
to recover an alternative approach to ethics that
stresses moral character, namely virtue ethics (Crisp &
Slote 1998, Hursthouse 1999). On the other hand, a
purely deontological approach that frames particular
issues from theological norms may seem out of touch
with secular ethical debates (Deane-Drummond et al.
2001:35–36). Virtue ethics, by focusing on the agent,
rather than just the possible outcomes of specific ethi-
cal dilemmas in isolation, encourages ongoing moral
attention that serves not only to sustain human
resilience in times when decision making is difficult,
but also to challenge all parties involved to re-examine
their attitudes. Virtue ethics is characterised by being
agent centred, rather than act centred, putting empha-
sis on goodness, rather than rights, duties or obliga-
tions, even positively rejecting the idea that ethics can
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be codified in rules. Yet this does not mean that virtue
ethics is not interested in particular actions, or for that
matter the consequences of those actions. Rather, the
fundamental ethical question of what I should do is
expanded into related questions about who I am, who I
should become and how I should get there (Keenan
1998: 84).
THEOLOGICAL WISDOM
What is meant by theological wisdom?3 Wisdom, by
definition, is hard to define with any precision, as she
appears in various guises in scriptural and traditional
texts. Nonetheless, even the early 17th century natural
scientists, such as John Ray, found the motif of wisdom
expressive of the way they hoped to discover traces of
God in the natural world (Ray 1977). Ray was reluctant
to attribute more to wisdom than a trace or reflection of
the mind of God in creation. Other theologians, writing
from an Eastern Orthodox perspective, have devel-
oped a Sophiology that places Wisdom integral to the
being of God.4 It seems fair to suggest that scriptural
texts point in this direction. In the Old Testament book
of Proverbs, for example, Wisdom is personified as the
one who works alongside God in the creation of the
world.5
Wisdom, according to the book of Wisdom, is ‘intelli-
gent, holy, unique, manifold, subtle, active, incisive,
unsullied, lucid, invulnerable, benevolent, sharp, irre-
sistible, beneficient, loving to man, steadfast, depend-
able, unperturbed, almighty, all-surveying’ (Wisdom
7:22–23). It could even be said that some wisdom
books, such as the book of Ecclesiastes, echo to some
extent the approach adopted by contemporary philoso-
phers advocating virtue ethics (Christianson 2002).
Wisdom in the Old Testament is also something that is
learnt in the human community, through experience in
practical decision-making in family life, education and
observation of the natural world. What are the possible
ways to find wisdom? The book of Proverbs invites his
readers to ‘Go to the ant, you sluggard, See its ways
and be wise’ (Proverbs 6:7). The seeing is not so much
simple observation of information about the ants, as
perceiving the inner distinctive core of what it is to be
an ant (Habel 2002). In other places in wisdom litera-
ture the word ‘to discern’ (bin) is used, often following
the act of seeing, to describe the process of becoming
wise. Hence discernment is integral to what it means to
gain wisdom. Discernment considers a range of
options, but ultimately lights on ‘the way’, understood
not just as the alternative between 2 paths, but also as
the inner driving characteristic of something (Habel
2002). This, it seems to me, is particularly important as
it locates discernment as that which correctly identifies
the inner core of something, that itself is expressive of
wisdom. Significantly, in the book of Job 28 the char-
acteristic of finding wisdom also applies to God, as God
‘sees’ the different components of creation (Habel
2002). On this basis it is possible that Proverbs 8:22
means not that God created wisdom, but the more
common understanding of the word qana, namely God
acquired wisdom. This reinforces the suggestion that I
have made elsewhere that an essential characteristic of
God is that of wisdom (Deane-Drummond 2000:
131–137). Moreover, there appears to be a dialectical
relationship between God and the world in the cre-
ative process. God creates through wisdom, but God
discovers wisdom in its turn in the created order. This
does not preclude the primary focus of the Christian
tradition on God relating to the world through over-
flowing love. Rather, creation is in love, but through
wisdom. This sapiential understanding of God’s rela-
tionship to the world has common ground with some
other religious traditions and serves to challenge the
individualistic way we think about ourselves and in its
place situate humanity in the wider cosmic community
of life (Nasr 1996: 205). 6
The Christian tradition, nonetheless, develops this
perennial philosophy in a way that is distinct, namely
through the notion of the wisdom of the cross (Deane-
Drummond 2000: 52–59). The cross is proclaimed as
the ultimate expression of the wisdom of God (1. Cor.
1.8–2.5). This aspect of wisdom might come as some-
thing of a shock, yet it serves as a reminder of the suf-
fering and cruelty evident in the natural world and in
human relationships. The wisdom of the cross
announces the fact that such suffering is not outside
the concern of God who is in Christ, rather the cruci-
fied one takes on such suffering in solidarity with the
earth. The savage loss of species could be said to be a
loss in God, for it is a loss in abundance of relationships
(Larkin 2002). Nonetheless, for the Christian tradition
the cross is not the last word, for its consideration is
coloured by hope in the resurrection. John’s Gospel
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3 I have discussed this idea in detail previously in Deane-
Drummond 2000
4 Sergii Bulgakov is a good example, though it should be
noted that his views on wisdom have been criticised by other
orthodox scholars, such as Vladimir Lossky (For discussion
see Deane-Drummond 2000: 78–92)
5 The developing interest in wisdom literature among Old
Testament scholars bespeaks of a relative neglect of this tra-
dition, see Deane-Drummond 2000: 15–22
6 Nasr criticises the West for its focus on environmental ethics;
for him a religious understanding of the order of nature
needs to have a higher priority. I suggest that a shift in un-
derstanding of ordering is commensurate with a new ethical
approachESEP 2002, 65–74
speaks of the Logos acting in the world in terms that
resemble very closely the way Wisdom is spoken about
in the Old Testament (Deane-Drummond 2003). Hence
Christ as Logos is identified with Wisdom or Sophia.
Yet for John the cross is also the cross of Glory, for it
points to a future in which all creation will be
redeemed. The message of wisdom is, then, ultimately
a hopeful one, even if it resists turning away from the
challenge of creaturely suffering. 
A RECOVERY OF A WISDOM ETHIC
While there are a variety of ways of thinking about
wisdom from a Christian perspective, I have argued
elsewhere that a wisdom ethic drawing on the works of
Thomas Aquinas gives significant insights about the
way to approach the natural world (Deane-Drummond
2000:99–107, 2002). Wisdom as theological wisdom
needs to be set in the context of the 3 theological
virtues of faith, hope and charity. (1 Cor. 13). Wisdom is
learned, but it is also a gift from God. As gift it is given
by grace, rather than through rigid adherence to the
law, even though it is not separate from law. Aquinas
describes the 7 gifts of the Holy Spirit as wisdom,
understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety
and fear of the Lord.7 In as much as it can be learned, it
can be shared by all those of good will, whether Chris-
tian or not. In this sense it is aligned with the idea of
natural law. Yet divine Wisdom also finds expression in
the eternal or divine law, which for Christians is
expressed in obedience to the demands of the Gospel
(Eph. 1. 8–10). Hence a measure of whether an action
is wise or not is in relationship to this divine law, a
point made repeatedly by Aquinas in his Summa The-
ologiae (Cessario 2001:58-59).8 For Aquinas wisdom is
one of the 3 intellectual virtues of speculative reason,
the others being understanding, or grasping first prin-
ciples and scientia, which denotes the comprehension
of the causes of things and the relationship between
them. In other words wisdom is the understanding of
the fundamental causes of everything and their rela-
tionship to everything else. In Aquinas wisdom is
expressed theologically, for God is the ultimate cause
of all that exists in virtue of the fact that God is creator.
Human wisdom is a virtue directed towards the Wis-
dom of God, for while wisdom can be learned it cannot
be grasped or used for human aggrandisement
(Proverbs 16). In the fullest sense human wisdom is
only possible through the gift of the Holy Spirit by the
grace of God. The Christian vocation includes develop-
ing the virtue of wisdom, seeking her through obedi-
ence to God’s covenant laws as well as acquiring her
through education and family life. 
Wisdom is closely related to one of the intellectual
virtues of practical reason, namely prudence, also
termed practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is particu-
larly significant for ethics, since it sets the way individ-
ual virtues must be expressed in particular circum-
stances. Developing prudence is not just about one’s
inner attitude, though it includes this, but it is also
about how this attitude is expressed in action.9 For
example, practical wisdom comes into play in discern-
ing what is the most appropriate way of acting in given
circumstances. Virtuous behaviour may, in some cir-
cumstances, be related to the means of attaining a par-
ticular goal. For example, genetically engineering seed
so that it is sterile in order to force farmers to buy new
seed every year could be seen as an inappropriate
means in order to attain the goal of maximum profits.
The goal itself may also be challenged where it
eclipses other goals such as respect for the needs of the
local community. In this case a form of ‘prudence’
would have led to the decision that sterile seed is the
best way of attaining the goal, but because the goal is
faulty, this leads to what Aquinas describes as ‘sham
prudence’. Indeed, for the biblical writers discernment
and wisdom are intimately linked with the fear of the
Lord (Proverbs 1.7, 2.5, 9.10 etc.). Hence, forms of dis-
cernment that act against the needs of the community
amount to folly. Perhaps more accurately we could say
that the goal is a partial good, for it benefits relatively
few people. Hence, a virtue ethic orientated around
wisdom includes the idea of consequences, but it is in
relationship to orientation towards the Good, under-
stood in terms of that which is in accordance with
covenant law. Aquinas also used the term ‘incomplete
prudence’ to indicate that the good is narrowed to par-
ticular individuals. These distorted forms of practical
wisdom are worth bearing in mind, since from the per-
spective of, for example, a biotechnology company an
action could look like it is entirely prudent. However,
once the wider needs of the community are taken into
account, such formulation of practical wisdom is shown
to be incomplete. In this scenario practical wisdom
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7 The traditional formulation takes its bearings from the
virtues possessed by the coming Messiah, as described by
Isaiah 11:1–2, and taken up in early Christian traditions as
corresponding to the gifts of the Spirit. (Cessario 2001:
205–12)
8 In the light of this it might seem surprising that some moral
philosophers have tended to abstract the idea of natural law
from Aquinas, and ignored its link with covenant relation-
ships. For discussion see Deane-Drummond 2002
9 Mary Midgley has criticised the effectiveness of prudence
for motivating environmental decision-making. However,
her understanding of prudence is one that relates simply to
rational causes and individual self-interest, rather than be-
ing situated in a broader theological understanding of wis-
dom in the manner I am suggesting here (Midgley 2001:188)Deane-Drummond: Wisdom with justice
relates strongly to justice, which I will discuss further
below. 
However, virtues are more subtle in that expressing
a particular virtue cannot necessarily always be
described through means and ends type of analysis.
What would count as behaving virtuously in the con-
text of the practice of science and technology? While
the goals of environmental decision-making and the
means of attaining such goals may come under
scrutiny through prudential considerations, the humil-
ity to accept that the public may have important
insights into social issues, the courage to challenge
developments in those cases where the opinion of local
farming communities have not been taken into
account, actions such as these are not readily analysed
simply in terms of means and ends. 
Practical wisdom includes a number of characteris-
tics that are worth pondering in the present context.
Aquinas draws on 5 areas related to knowing, namely
memory, reason, understanding, aptness to being
taught and ingenuity (Aquinas 1974: 55).10 Clearly rea-
son, understanding and ingenuity all come into play in
developing scientific methods that are sensitive to
environmental concerns. Yet these characteristics
alone are not sufficient for practical wisdom, since it
includes memory as well. The ability to remember is
associated with appreciation of history and tradition.
The memory is used in a selective way in devising new
technologies. Historically biotechnology has emerged
as one more example of the way humankind engages
with the natural world. However, it cannot simply be
isolated from the social context of the culture of mod-
ern industrial farming (Northcott 2002). While it may
not be possible to return to earlier idealised communi-
ties, in the way that Northcott seems to suggest, a
deeper memory of what it means for humanity to be in
relationship with the land would shift what is envis-
aged in terms of practical wisdom. 
Aquinas identifies 3 areas of practical wisdom
related to doing, namely foresight, circumspection and
caution, or avoiding obstacles (Aquinas 1974: 55–57).
11 Foresight means the ability to be free from particular
biases and to discern how far the intended aim
matches the overall goal of human life understood as
ultimate goodness. Where these goals are narrowly
portrayed in terms of the particular products of tech-
nology, then foresight is distorted. For example, does
the introduction of vital vitamins to rice and other sta-
ple crops grown in the poorer nations of the world even
begin to solve the problem of nutrition in these
nations? A technological fix can only be a temporary
and even partial solution; for it ignores the fact that
world hunger is more often than not the result of eco-
nomic and social problems.12 Even expecting multina-
tional companies to solve the world food crisis is a fail-
ure of foresight, for it assumes that they will behave
altruistically rather than be driven by market forces
(Stewart 2002). Circumspection is the ability to attend
to circumstances, and involves a clear perception of
reality. For example, the possible ecological damage
associated with genetically modified crops has not so
far been adequately researched, since ‘we do not have
an adequate ecological understanding of the complex
interactions engendered by releasing GMOs even into
semi-natural ecosystems’ (Walton 2000: 15).13 Finally,
prudence also expresses caution, or avoiding obsta-
cles. There are numerous examples in genetic technol-
ogy where there are clear risks involved either to
human health or the environment. Where these risks
are exaggerated, this amounts to a distortion of practi-
cal wisdom. For example, the research published by Dr
Arpad Pusztai claiming that a modified lectin gene
causes adverse effects in rats was not subjected to nor-
mal peer review and scrutiny prior to publication
(Deane-Drummond 2001: 65). Despite this, campaign-
ers and the media have used his work to make irre-
sponsible claims that genetic modification causes seri-
ous intestinal infection in rats, when in fact his
research simply describes the structure of the small
intestine (Dixon 2001:275). 
The precautionary principle is commonly adopted by
committees adjudicating on whether or not to approve
particular developments in GM research and associ-
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10 While Aquinas takes this list from Aristotle, biblical wisdom
also includes similar ideas of memory and aptness to being
taught (Proverbs 3:1), reason and understanding (Proverbs
2:5, 18:15) and ingenuity (Proverbs 8:30)
12 Correcting one vitamin deficiency alone is likely to be of
limited benefit because of the interaction between different
vitamins and minerals needed for good health. While the
researchers involved were in all probability well aware of
this limitation, it is worth asking if the funding spent so far
on such a development is really appropriate, given its lim-
ited value. Shiva has suggested that red rice growing natu-
rally has about ten times the concentration of vitamin A
compared with the ‘golden rice’ modified by genetic engi-
neering. (Shiva 2002).  Public consultation is critical if such
developments are not going to be perceived as yet another
form of neo-colonialism, however good the intentions. The
virtue of foresight can serve to encourage such a wider per-
ception, rather than limiting the consideration to one of iso-
lated problem solving
13 David Walton suggests, that if the funding was supported
by the state then there might be greater public acceptance
that ‘objectives were really feeding the hungry and not
greater dividends, and that the control and oversight mech-
anisms were robust enough to ensure that health and the
environment would be protected as far as possible’, Walton
2000:15
11 These ideas are also found in instructions to those who wish
to acquire wisdom in Proverbs, for circumspection, see
Proverbs 14:8, for foresight and caution see Proverbs 14:16,
22:3ESEP 2002, 65–74
ated environmental decisions. In this scenario we are
left with the alternatives to adopt or reject the precau-
tionary principle, along with difficulties of its defini-
tion. Instead, I suggest that precaution needs to be just
one factor set in a much wider frame of practical wis-
dom, including the various elements indicated above.
The lack of trust of governments on the part of the pub-
lic is suggestive of alternative ways of framing deci-
sion-making that takes this suspicion into account
(Deane-Drummond et al. 2001:23–24). Wisdom, as that
which delves behind the attitudes of those making the
decisions, is one possible step in the rebuilding of rela-
tionships that is so vitally needed. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE AS VIRTUE
I indicated earlier that virtue of justice is an appro-
priate companion to prudence and wisdom in framing
appropriate ethical action. The ancient sages were
well aware of the link between justice and wisdom,
indeed Proverbs personifies Lady Wisdom as one who
‘By me monarchs rule and princes issue just laws; by
me rulers govern and the great impose justice on the
world’ (Proverbs 8.16–17). In the monarchical society
of the time, kingship, wisdom and justice were inter-
twined. A more appropriate framework for today is
kinship, rather than kingship, but this shift need not
deny the basic principle of linking justice and wisdom.
Virtue ethicists have tended to associate justice with
Kantian ethics, but for Aquinas justice is also a virtue to
be acquired, alongside prudence or practical wis-
dom.14 Indeed when justice is defined in association
with rights, it no longer makes logical sense to speak of
justice towards future generations that is the premise
of much environmental concern (Beckerman & Pasek
2001:11–45). This means that additional ethical
resources are required in order to elucidate obliga-
tions, and Beckerman & Pasek are driven to hint at the
possibility of virtue theory making a contribution in
this respect. However it is not filled out in any detail
and they seem to assume that justice is not a virtue
(Beckerman & Pasek 2001:24–25). Of course, unlike
the other virtues, justice also has an objective basis
through particular acts that could be characterised as
just or not. In this sense justice moves away from virtue
ethics sensus strictus in terms of agents and attitudes
towards a more deontological position.15 In a similar
way I indicated earlier that consequences are also
taken into account in making prudential choices. This
means that those following Kantian views can take into
account some of the advantages gained through virtue
ethics, so I suggest that it is possible to incorporate
ideas about what counts as justice without losing the
emphasis on the importance of the virtues. In a just
order, each is given his or her due. This once again
raises the priority of consideration of the needs of the
poor as well as consideration of non-human creatures
and the wider environment. Beckerman & Pasek pre-
dict that there will be continuing economic growth and
this will have a trickle down effect on alleviation of
basic environmental problems and poverty, though
basic human rights remain untouched by economic
trends (2001:89–106). Yet their assumption that acute
problems associated with environment and poverty
will become progressively ameliorated amounts to eco-
nomic reductionism based on economic forecasts. In
addition, they seem to assume that the demands of the
environment and those of the poor are in some sense in
competition for the same economic resources, while
recognising that they do at times intersect. Clearly, the
means of deciding which environmental problem takes
priority over which particular demand from a human
community is critical, but this is not discussed. It is one
of the reasons why I suggest that justice needs to be
aligned with practical wisdom, understood as discern-
ment: once justice is considered to be a virtue it no
longer has to be associated so closely with the lan-
guage of rights. The human virtue of justice, under-
stood in terms of human obligations, can take into
account the importance of the non-human species as
part of the overall ecological community.
What are the duties in relation to the ‘others’ in the
community of life? Certainly, there may be legally
binding actions that have to be undertaken, that are
more based on particular objective rules, but also
morally binding ones as well that are more closely
aligned with attitudes of the agents. Even within the
moral sphere it is possible to distinguish that which is
dishonourable as opposed to that which is unseemly.
The distinction between these various forms of justice
as virtue can be illustrated as follows. Ten thousand
hectares of genetically engineered cotton have been
found growing in India in the Western state of Gujarat
(Jayaraman 2001: 555). The cotton had been geneti-
cally engineered to resist the bollworm using a gene
from Bacillus thuringiensis. This gene (Bt) acts like an
insecticide in the plants, and they are no longer
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14 Onora O’Neill combines a Kantian approach with virtue
ethics, see  O’Neill 1996
15 It could be argued that wisdom also, as a theological cate-
gory, moves away from virtue ethics in the manner under-
stood by most philosophers. However, my intention is not to
simply imitate virtue ethics, but to draw on these insights
and incorporate them into a theocentric ethic of wisdom.
Such a theocentric ethic is less alienating compared with
other deontological theological positions, as it resonates
with the language of virtues and orientates discussion
around agents first, prior to consideration of particular theo-
logical principles Deane-Drummond: Wisdom with justice
infected. The farmers purchased their seed from Navb-
harat, a small company which originally purchased
seed from Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company,
Mahyco. Monsato have a 26% stake in the latter com-
pany and the seed is freely available for purchase in
the USA. The row exploded because Monsanto discov-
ered Bt cotton on farms on the Western state of Gujarat
and they had not been paid for the patents. Navbharat
could argue that it lacked the technology to detect
transgenic strains. From a legal perspective the action
of Navbharat is against the law, breaking the legal
requirement to pay dividends for patents on particular
‘inventions’, in this case GM cotton. It is not clear if
Monsato had been granted an Indian patent on Bt cot-
ton as the work with Mahyco was still at the field trial
stage. Mahyco had spent US$8 million on preparing to
commercialise Bt cotton for the Indian market. In terms
of business ethics Mahyco/Monsato did have their par-
ticular ‘rights’ violated according to patent law. It is
also worth asking how far the Indian regulatory system
is able to ensure that the patent can be carried out in
terms of monitoring the seed. Perhaps the Indian
authorities were imprudent in granting a patent in the
first place. From the perspective of justice in the widest
sense it is possible to ask whether the multinational
giant Monsanto is morally justified in making such
demands for patent payments where it is doubtful if
India would ever  have the resources for adequate
monitoring. 
The practice of Western companies indulging in
‘gene piracy’ (i.e. the lifting of genetic resources from
poorer nations and then imposing a patent on them), as
well as the introduction of particular genetic traits such
as ‘terminator genes’, serve to break down the trust
between larger companies and our neighbours in the
Southern nations of the world (Bruce & Horrocks 2002:
132–134).16 Both Monsanto’s attitude and their action
could be said to be dishonourable in making demands
for payments for patents from nations that can ill afford
to do so. In addition, the imposition of patent law
implies that frameworks adequate for an industrialised
Western nation cannot be applied in a crude way to
that of a poorer ‘developing’ community. It raises wider
questions about the whole system of patenting as
applied on an international level. Moreover what
would be the social consequences for subsistent farm-
ers growing traditional crops if agricultural practice
shifted significantly towards commercial GMOs? The
motivation of Monsanto in developing GM cotton for
the Indian market was clearly commercial. If the offi-
cials on either side behaved in such as way as to
express hostility or anger, then such an attitude could
be said to be unseemly. Justice is violated in this case
because it serves to break down relationships in a com-
munity. All acts of virtue relate in one sense or another
to justice, hence Aquinas refers to justice as the ‘most
perfect virtue’. 17 Developing cash crops specifically for
use in the Indian subcontinent could be said to be an
example of ecological injustice. The chairman of an
Indian department of biotechnology committee has
asked whether ‘this is a foretaste of a frightening situ-
ation where transgenics will be out of control and all
over the place’. 18 Yet the ‘solution’ to this biotechno-
logical problem is to press for Rs100 million to be spent
on national laboratories to monitor GMOs. Given the
reality of the shortage of funds for other work, is this a
just use of resources? 
The above example suggests that an act of justice
can be judged, as it were, from the outside in an objec-
tive way. This makes justice different from the other
virtues such as temperance or fortitude. Acts of justice
are not necessarily affected by particular dispositions
towards another; hence it is possible to act justly while
not having an inner disposition towards justice. It may
be that the Indian company mistakenly mixed up the
seed used, but while this would be a legal injustice
according to patent law, it would not render the com-
pany unjust. However, the ideal of justice as virtue
requires both an inner assent to justice as well as an
external just action. Justice also reflects obligations to
the community, hence in Aquinas’s scheme it is ranked
higher than other virtues such as temperance or forti-
tude that relate simply to inner dispositions.
While justice as virtue is the starting point for effec-
tive environmental decision-making, consideration of
wider concerns of justice locates the virtue in the con-
text of a particular way of thinking in an objective
sense about just relationships. Aquinas divided the just
ordering in community life to firstly that between indi-
viduals, or commutative justice; secondly to that
between the whole and the individual or distributive
justice; and thirdly that between the individual and
social whole or legal justice (Pieper 1966:70–74).
These distinctions follow from the fact that the kind of
legal protection afforded by the state is different in
kind to that which is due between individuals. The
philosopher Josef Pieper criticises individualism in not
taking sufficient account of the reality of the social
whole in making just decisions (Pieper 1966:70–74).
On the other hand, there is an opposite danger in col-
lectivism, where no one individual enters a relation-
ship in their own right. In this case no individual is
given any right, and hence no due. The idea of justice
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16 Vandana Shiva has called this kind of action ‘piracy’. See
Shiva 1998, 2001
17 I am drawing on the somewhat neglected work of the Ro-
man Catholic philosopher, Josef Pieper (1966)
18 Cited in Jayaraman 2001ESEP 2002, 65–74
collapses. Some forms of deep ecology and Gaian
thinking seem to lean far too heavily in this direction.
Of course Aquinas’ scheme fails to take into account
the corporate nature of contemporary existence in so
far as today, legally speaking, multinational companies
have rights. Hence particular companies have particu-
lar responsibilities to act according to the law. 
Commutative justice is what is owed to a stranger
and follows what is due according to particular con-
tracts. For all intents and purposes commutative justice
could be said to apply to biotechnological companies in
relation to individuals and their claims for particular
demands for what is due in their case. The relationship
between parties needs to be one of mutual respect,
rather than hostility, so that the task of commutative
justice is:
‘to bring solace and order into the conflict of contending
interests which by their nature are legitimate opposites
and not easily reconcilable, to impose on them, as it were,
a posterior order, is the office and task of commutative
justice’ (Pieper 1966:79).
In the case of GMOs the task of commutative justice
would be to ensure that no damage exists to someone
or their property as a result of the release of GMOs.
However, where accidents happen, such as in the case
of accidental contamination of organic farms during
field trials of GMOs, then compensation would be
required since some recompense needs to be made. Of
course this presupposes that it is possible for GMO
field trials to take place without any risk of contamina-
tion. Given the close proximity of different farming
practices in countries such as the UK, this may not be
feasible. In this scenario, it might be possible to argue
for ‘organic-free zones’ as well as ‘GM free zones’. The
just person needs to recognise the wrong committed,
admit to the injustice and endeavour to eradicate it.
The problem in the case of organic farming is that both
organic and non-organic farmers claim an equal right
to practice farming according to particular principles,
though an assessment of risk to organic farmers would
seem to be prudent prior to approval of field trials. 
The case of multinationals also crosses into a second
area of justice, namely distributive justice, since this
describes the relationship between those who have
power and those who are in some sense ‘delivered’ to
this power. Since biotechnology is governed largely by
the work of multinationals plus in some cases central
government, the responsibility for just action becomes
one of distributive justice. The difference is that
whereas in the classic understanding of distributive
justice, what belongs to an individual is a share in what
belongs to everyone, for multinationals, apart from its
relationship to its own employees or stake holders, the
individual has no share or part in its activities, except
in so far as the flourishing of the company boosts the
overall economy of the state as a whole. 
Those who are guardians of the common weal calcu-
late what is due to the individual in the case of distrib-
utive justice. For state rendered compensation, partic-
ular subjects of particular grievances are taken into
account in a way that is not true of commutative jus-
tice. Yet where those who are responsible do not exer-
cise their powers justly, then injustice reigns. Where
the law of the state restrains multinationals to act
responsibly towards individuals and the environment,
then one can expect some measure of justice to ensue.
However, what happens in those situations where state
law is less regulated such as the relative lack of regu-
lations on the safe use of chemicals, fertilisers and also
genetically modified crops in the poorer nations of the
world? According to a recent report ‘developing coun-
tries have less well developed regulatory structures
and expertise to manage the introduction of GM crops
appropriately’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1999:
136). In this case justice relies on being exercised by
the multinational companies towards strangers, in this
case those living in such nations. The parties to the
global convention on biodiversity (CBD) are trying to
adopt a Biosafety Protocol. While this may act like ‘a
first line of defence’ it relies on members being part of
this wider global community. In these instances, inter-
national bodies also contribute to the working out of
justice. 
CONCLUSIONS
In addition to social and political considerations, I
have argued that in order to uncover the reasons
behind difficulties in environmental decision making
we need to explore human attitudes and motivation.
One attitude of particular significance is that of wis-
dom, for not only does it link with practical reason
through prudence, but also from a theological perspec-
tive it joins with an understanding of the relationship
between God, humanity and the world. In other words
wisdom invites a theocentric perspective on ethics that
does not exclude secular ethical considerations, but
encompasses and critiques different secular alterna-
tives. Given that I have argued for a recovery of
Aquinas’ way of approaching ethics, his views on prac-
tical wisdom and justice as virtues are also of particu-
lar importance. Prudence is the first of the cardinal
virtues and serves to shape the way they develop. In
other words, there can be no justice without prudence.
Justice is situated in the context of right relationships
between God and the created world understood in
terms of covenant. The nature of the relationships
themselves can be described theologically in terms of
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wisdom. How might this work out in practical decision-
making? I suggest that those who are responsible for
making decisions have a responsibility to examine
closely the attitudes and motivation of all contesting
parties. In terms of raising environmental awareness
and concern, wisdom reminds us of the importance of
the created order, the need to consider the beauty and
intricacy of creation, and hence is aligned to other
virtues such as wonder and humility. A virtue ethic ori-
entated on wisdom challenges the sufficiency of conse-
quential approaches, while including the prudential
discernment of consequences as integral to what it
means to have virtue. For Christian believers such
scrutiny of attitudes becomes part and parcel of Chris-
tian discipleship, since such decisions are consistent
with what it means to inaugurate the reign of God and
express God’s wisdom. The Christian vision includes
one of kinship with creatures, so that all creatures are
not simply for instrumental human use, but are given
respect as those that embody, to some degree, the wis-
dom of God. 
In discussing the merits or otherwise of biotechno-
logical change, justice between individuals and corpo-
rations is not simply definable in terms of breaking the
law such as that covering patents, because there are
moral aspects of justice that make particular attitudes
and actions dishonourable. Yet justice requires pru-
dential consideration of the alternatives before a claim
can be made. In other words, the ability to see reality
clearly—which is the province of practical wisdom -
leads to actions that affect human relationships with
each other—which is the province of justice. This
paper has attempted to delineate some of the ways in
which wisdom and justice as virtues could facilitate
environmental decision-making. I have argued that
wisdom is integral to an understanding of who God is
and thus needs to be reflected in the way humanity
relates to each other and to the natural world. The
search for wisdom is always incomplete, for it involves
the shared search of the wider community of the pub-
lic including theologians and scientists. I suggest that it
is in and through such collaboration that respect for
God and for each other develops. Perhaps we can say
that this developing respect is the beginning of wis-
dom (Proverbs 1:1–7).
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